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Abstract
In this paper, targeted fooling of high performance image classifiers is achieved
by developing two novel attack methods. The first method generates universal per-
turbations for target classes and the second generates image specific perturbations.
Extensive experiments are conducted on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets to provide
insights about the proposed algorithms and show their effectiveness.
1 Introduction
There has been a recent interest in ‘breaking’ neural networks by generating adversarial examples
which cause trained networks to misclassify. This is an important direction of research as it helps
one identify vulnerabilities in the system before malicious attacks can be launched to exploit them.
Adversarial samples also help in generating more varied training data, which makes deep classifiers
robust [2], [6].
Let x be an image drawn from the distribution on which a classifier C is trained. The semantic
class of image x is denoted by cx ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}, where n denotes the total number of classes.
The output of C is a discrete probability distribution p ∈ [0, 1]n, where the probability of class
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} is p[j]. Let, xˆ be the corresponding transformed image, which attempts to
fool C. It is desired that visually x and xˆ look similar, i.e., x ≈ xˆ. Thus, the definition of ‘targeted
fooling’ to a target class t is given by
argmax(C(xˆ)) = t 6= cx, x ≈ xˆ. (1)
The problem of ‘misclassification’, defined as
argmax(C(xˆ)) 6= cx, x ≈ xˆ, (2)
is a weaker problem since successful ‘targeted fooling’ implies successful ‘misclassification’.
In this paper the problem specified by eq.1 is addressed by two proposed algorithms that fool
classifiers by: 1) learning Universal Perturbations for Steering to Exact Targets (UPSET); and 2)
distorting images using an Antagonistic Network for Generating Rogue Images (ANGRI).
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2 Related Works
Development of image perturbation algorithms for fooling deep neural networks can be very useful
for generating more effective training samples and for finding flaws in trained models [1]. The
algorithms can be divided according to the following criteria:
1. Coherency of Input Images: One of the most popular works demonstrating the weaknesses of
Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (DCNN) is [13]. The authors use Genetic Algorithms
to generate images that have no semantic meaning to human observers, but which can make
deep CNN classifiers predict classes with high confidence. However since this model generates
semantically incoherent images, they are easily identifiable by humans as adversarial. The next
class of algorithms transform images by adding visually imperceptible residuals such as in
[1], [2], [11], [16], [10]. The algorithms generate tampered images that match the input image
visually, but still fool the classifier. Similar to the later algorithms, the proposed methods in this
paper also generate perturbed images that are visually similar to the input images.
2. Victim access: In [2], [16], [15], [12] etc, the adversarial algorithms need knowledge of the
internals of the victim model (white-box), as opposed to [1], [14], [7], [11], and [9] which are
black-box attack models. The proposed methods are able to mount a black-box attack.
3. Cross model generalization: Algorithms in [15], [12] target a particular classifier while the
methods in [13], [11], [17], [16], and [9] generalize to other classifiers which they have not
been trained for. The methods described in this paper generalize across classifiers with similar
structures.
4. Pattern universality: Most algorithms generate different perturbations for different inputs, but
[11] generates a single perturbation which universally causes incorrect classification. One of
the methods in this paper produces perturbations universal to each class.
5. Targeted fooling: Algorithms such as [11] consider a weak version of ‘fooling’ where it is
enough to cause the classifier to misclassify. However [1], [15], [10], [4] tackle a more difficult
problem, where the classifier has to predict a particular target class; the two methods proposed
in this paper belong to the latter.
6. Multiple victims: Some schemes, like [1] and the methods described here, can target multiple
victim classifiers together by explicitly training against them simultaneously, while others such
as [14], [11], [13] etc. can target only one at a time.
3 Proposed Algorithms
In this work, given an input image, a target class and a pre-trained classifier, the goal is to generate an
image that looks similar to the input but fools the classifier by making it predict the target class as
the output, as summarized in eq. 1. In this section, two black-box-attack algorithms, UPSET and
ANGRI are proposed for ‘targeted fooling’.
3.1 UPSET: Universal Perturbations for Steering to Exact Targets
In an n class setting, UPSET seeks to produce n universal perturbations rj , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, such
that when rj is added to any image not in class j, the classifier will classify the resulting image as
being from class j. The main workhorse of UPSET is a residual generating network R, which takes
as input a target class t and produces a perturbation rt = R(t), which is of the same dimension as the
input image x. The adversarial image xˆ is generated by
xˆ = U(x, t) = max (min (s×R(t) + x, 1),−1), (3)
where U denotes the UPSET network. The pixel values in x are normalized to lie in [−1, 1]. The
network R also produces values in the range [−1, 1]. The output of R is multiplied with a scaling
factor s as shown in eq. 3. Setting s = 2 ensures that s×R(t) is able to transform any value in the
input space [−1, 1] to any value in [−1, 1] when added to x. But lower values of s may be chosen,
which limit the maximum possible residual value at every pixel. After the addition, the output is
in the range of [−(s+ 1), s+ 1]. It is clipped to [−1, 1] to produce a valid image. This adversarial
image generation process is shown in fig. 1a.
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(a) Training scheme for UPSET(U ). (b) Training scheme for ANGRI(A).
Figure 1: Training networks for generating adversarial images. x is the input image, t is the target
class, and xˆ is the output adversarial image.
3.2 ANGRI: Antagonistic Network for Generating Rogue Images
ANGRI takes an input image, x, belonging to class cx, and a target class, t 6= cx, and transforms it
into a new image, xˆ, such that the classifier mislabels it as being an object from class t. Compared to
UPSET, ANGRI does not produce universal perturbations, as its output depends on the input image.
The transformed image is xˆ = A(x, t), where A denotes the ANGRI network.
3.3 Loss Function
Given m pretrained classifiers Ci, denote their output classification probabilities for an adversarial
image xˆ by pi, that is, pi = Ci(xˆ). Then loss, for both UPSET and ANGRI, is defined in eq. 4.
L(x, xˆ, t) = LC(xˆ, t) + LF (x, xˆ) = −
m∑
i=1
log(Ci(xˆ)[t]) + w ‖ xˆ− x ‖kk, (4)
where, LC denotes (mis)classification loss and LF denotes fidelity loss. LC is a categorical cross-
entropy loss that penalizes the generator network if the classifier does not predict the target class,
t, and LF is the norm of the differences between x and xˆ which ensures that the input and output
images look similar. Weight w is used to trade off between fidelity and fooling capability of the
generated adversarial example. The choice of k should be such that it does not promote sparsity, else
the residuals will accumulate in small regions and will be conspicuous. It suffices to use k = 2, that is,
the L2 norm. In the case of UPSET, since the network already generates a residual, the second term
in eq. 4 is substituted by ‖ R(x, t) ‖22. The training schemes of the two systems with the associated
losses are shown in fig. 1.
4 Experimental Results
The following four metrics are used for evaluating the performances of the proposed fooling networks:
1. Targeted fooling rate (TFR): Rate of occurrence of the event defined by eq. 1 (Higher means
that the classifier is easily fooled).
2. Misclassification rate (MR): Rate of occurrence of the event defined by eq. 2 (Higher means
that the classifier is easily fooled).
3. Fidelity score (FS): Mean residual norm per pixel per channel (Lower means that the residual is
less conspicuous).
4. Confidence (C): Mean probabilities of the target class when successfully fooled. This shows
the confidence of the classifier when it is fooled. (Higher means it is more confident for the
incorrect class).
Training UPSET or ANGRI with multiple classifiers is referred to as ‘simultaneous’ training. If
UPSET or ANGRI is trained and tested on the same set of classifiers, it is called ‘self’ attack, else it
is called ‘cross’ attack. The results are described on two datasets MNIST [8] and CIFAR-10 [5].
4.1 Network Architectures
This section describes the network architectures of the classifier, UPSET, and ANGRI models for
both MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. The networks are defined using the following notation:
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1. Activation functions: ReLU (R) or Leaky ReLU (L) is used everywhere except in the last layers
which use softmax (S) or tanh (T ) activation functions.
2. Regulatization: Dφ denotes dropout with probability φ and B denotes batch-normalization.
3. Identity: No regularization or activation is denoted by the identity layer, I .
4. Convolutional layer: Cµ,ν,ζ,β,γ denotes convolutional layers with ν filters of kernel size µ× µ
with strides ζ and followed by regularization β and activation function γ.
5. Deconvolution layer: DCµ,ν,ζ,γ denotes a deconvolution layer with ν filters of kernel size
µ× µ with strides ζ and followed by activation function γ
6. Dense: Fλ,γ denotes a fully connected layer with λ nodes followed by activation function γ.
7. Pooling layers: M`,ζ denotes a max-pooling layer of kernel size ` × ` and stride ζ, and A
denotes an average pooling layer.
8. Blocks: Rγ is a residual block similar to the one defined in [3] which contains regularization γ.
4.1.1 MNIST
For MNIST experiments, three classifier networks, M1, M2, and M3, are trained. M1 is a network
with 2 convolutional layers and 2 dense layers. M2 is similar to M1, but with more parameters. M3
is a dense network with 3 layers. The structures of the classifier networks are:
1. M1 : C3,32,1,I,R → C3,64,1,I,R →M2,1 → F128,R → D0.5 → F10,S
2. M2 : C3,64,1,I,R → C3,128,1,I,R →M2,1 → F256,R → D0.5 → F10,S
3. M3 : F512,R → D0.5 → F256,R → D0.5 → F10,S
An additional model M4 with exactly the same architecture as M1, is trained with additive noise
in the input MNIST digit images as well as with rotation (±10 degree), and shift (20% along both
axes). The initial test set accuracy of the four models are 99.11%, 99.23% , 97.39% and 98.03%
respectively. All classifiers are trained for 12 epochs and all UPSET and ANGRI models described in
the following sections are trained for 25 epochs.
The UPSET network’s residual generator R (fig. 1a) consists of six dense layers as shown below:
R : F128,R → F256,L → F512,L → F1024,L → F512,L → F784,T .
For ANGRI, the base network for 10-D target, At, the base network for the 784-D input image, Ax,
and the top network Ac (as shown in fig. 1b) are defined as:
At : F128,L → F256,L → F512,L, Ax : F128,L → F256,L → F512,L,
Ac : [At, AI ]→ F1024,L → F512,L → F784,T .
4.1.2 CIFAR-10
Four classifiers, C1 −C4 are trained. C1 and C2 are resnet style networks, while C3 and C4 are deep
convolutional networks with 9 and 4 convolutional layers respectively. The initial test set accuracies
of the four classifiers, C1−C4, are 86.65%, 86.58%, 86.86% and 87.09% respectively. The networks
are shown below:
1. C1 : C7,64,2,B,R → M3,2 → C3,64,1,I,I → RB → RB → RB → RB → RB → RB →
RB → B → R→ A→ F10,S
2. C2 : C7,64,2,D0.5,R → M3,2 → C3,64,1,I,I → RD0.3 → RD0.3 → RD0.3 → RD0.3 →
RD0.3 → RD0.3 → RD0.3 → B → R→ A→ F10,S
3. C3 : C3,32,1,I,L → C3,32,1,I,L → M2,2 → C3,64,1,I,L → C3,128,1,I,L → D0.5 →
C3,256,1,I,L → M2,2 → D0.5 → C3,128,1,I,L → D0.5 → C3,64,1,I,L → M2,2 →
C3,32,1,I,L → D0.5 → C3,16,1,I,L → D0.5 → F256,L → D0.5 → F10,S
4. C4 : C3,32,1,I,R → C3,32,1,I,R → M2,2 → D0.5 → C3,64,1,I,R → C3,64,1,I,R → M2,2 →
D0.5 → F512,R → D0.5 → F10,S
The UPSET network R (fig. 1a) for CIFAR-10 is a network with 6 deconvolutional layers, followed
by 6 convolutional layers, as defined below:
R : DC3,32,2,L → DC3,64,2,L → DC3,64,2,L → DC3,128,2,L → DC3,128,2,L → DC3,128,2,L →
C3,128,1,I,L → C3,64,2,1,L → C1,32,1,I,L → C1,16,1,I,L → C1,8,1,I,L → C1,3,1,I,T .
The ANGRI network for CIFAR-10 has 3 sections as shown in fig. 1b. Both the At network, which
takes a 10-D one-hot target vector as input, and the Ax network, which takes a 3× 32× 32 image
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Figure 2: Sample of adversarial images from MNIST. Each column represents input classes 0 to 9,
while each row represents target classes 0 to 9. The left image in each cell is generated using ANGRI
(w = 0.1), while the right is from UPSET (w = 0.06).
(a) Fooling percentage for each target class.
It is difficult to make the classifier say that
an image is 0 or 1 when it is not so.
(b) UPSET residuals with varying weights on visual
loss for MNIST. Weights increase with rows. Columns
represent each target class.
Figure 3: Analysis of UPSET (w = 0.06, s = 2) for MNIST.
as input, have 3 deconvolutional layers. The Ac network after the merging of At and Ax has 3
deconvolutions, followed by 6 convolutional layers. The exact structure is summarized below:
At : DC3,32,2,L → DC3,64,2,L → DC3,64,2,L, Ax : DC3,32,1,L → DC3,64,2,L → DC3,128,2,L,
Ac : [At, AI ]→ DC3,128,2,L → DC3,128,2,L → DC3,128,2,L → C3,128,1,I,L → C3,64,2,I,L →
C1,32,1,I,L → C1,16,1,I,L → C1,8,1,I,L → C1,3,1,I,T .
4.2 Sample Images and Residuals
Some sample successful adversarial images for MNIST are shown in fig. 2, generated using w = 0.1
for ANGRI and w = 0.06, s = 2 for UPSET. Fig. 3a shows the rate of successful attacks per target
class. Clearly, targets 0 and 1 are difficult to generate residuals for. Reflecting that fact, in fig. 3b it
can be seen that as visual loss weight w increases, UPSET stops generating residuals for classes 0
and 1. As w increases UPSET is forced to add residuals of less magnitude. Therefore, it gives up on
these difficult targets and reserves its visual loss budget for the classes it can successfully fool.
Fig. 4 shows some sample outputs of UPSET and ANGRI for each input and target class in CIFAR-10.
The difference between magnitudes of perturbations for ANGRI and UPSET can be seen clearly in
fig. 5. Also, in fig. 5b, the residuals have more variations, since ANGRI produces image specific
distortions, unlike UPSET which produces target specific perturbations independent of the input
image. Therefore, ANGRI is able to generate more visually inconspicuous distortions as compared to
UPSET as can be seen in fig. 4.
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Figure 4: Sample of adversarial images from CIFAR-10. Each column represents input classes 0 to 9,
while each row represents target classes 0 to 9. The left image in each cell is generated using ANGRI
(w = 0.11), while the right is from UPSET (w = 0.08). Thus the image in row 4, column 7 looks
like a frog, but is classified as a cat.(Best viewed electronically)
4.3 Effect of Visual Loss Weight
The effect of varying the visual loss weight w is studied on MNIST. It is varied from 0.01 to 0.2 in
steps of 0.01. Two cases are considered, one with classifier M1 and the other with M4. Note that both
classifiers have the same architecture, but M4 is trained with augmented data as described in Section
4.1.1. Fig. 6a shows that, as expected, the fooling rates decrease as the fidelity score increases, that is,
by adding residuals with higher magnitudes to the images UPSET and ANGRI are able to fool better.
Fig. 6b shows that with increasing weight of visual loss, fooling rates go down as the network is now
forced to add smaller residuals to corrupt the input image. In both images in fig. 6 MR is greater than
TFR, since targeted fooling is a stronger condition than misclassification. For the region of high TFR
(greater than about 60%), ANGRI produces residuals of lower magnitude than UPSET. Also, it is
more difficult to fool M4 than M1, which means that having noise in training data helps make the
classifier more robust against UPSET or ANGRI. However, as depicted in fig. 6a, ANGRI shows
only a slight drop in performance for M4, unlike UPSET.
4.3.1 Simultaneous Training and Cross Model Generalization
For this experiment, UPSET models are trained with s = 2 and w = 0.06, while ANGRI models are
trained with w = 0.1. The generalizability of the proposed methods is studied by considering their
TFR when attacking a different classifier than the one it was trained on. Since network architecture
might have a strong effect on generalizability, different categories of classifiers are trained. In MNIST
there are two convolutional networks, M1 and M2 and one dense network M3. In CIFAR-10 there
are two resnet style networks, C1 and C2, and two convolutional networks, C3 and C4.
Table 1 summarizes the results for self (train and test on Ci) and cross (train on Ci and test on
Cj , i 6= j) attacks for MNIST. For CIFAR-10, table 2 reports the self and cross attack TFRs for
UPSET and ANGRI models trained with a single classifier, while table 3 shows the performance for
simultaneous training with two classifiers. Some key observations from the tables are:
1. Cross attack fooling rates are lower than self attack rates.
2. UPSET and ANGRI models trained with a classifier of a certain structure (convolu-
tional/resnet/dense) are able to fool other classifiers of similar structures much better than
those of different structures. UPSET and ANGRI models trained with resnet style classifiers
seem to generalize well to other structures in CIFAR-10. However, when trained on classifiers
with non-resnet structures, neither method is able to fool other types of classifiers.
3. Training UPSET or ANGRI with multiple classifiers together helps them generalize better.
This is clearly seen when comparing the TFRs in tables 2 and 3. Let Ci, Cj → Ck mean that
UPSET and ANGRI are trained with Ci and Cj , and then used to attack Ck. In almost all cases,
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(a) UPSET (trained with C1) residuals with varying weights (rows) on visual loss of ten different targets
(columns) for CIFAR-10.
(b) ANGRI (trained with C1, w = 0.11) residuals for ten different target classes (columns) and three different
input images (rows) from CIFAR-10.
Figure 5: Residuals from UPSET for CIFAR-10. White depicts large positive values, black depicts
large negative values, and gray depicts zero residual. (Best viewed electronically)
(a) Fooling rates vs. fidelity scores for MNIST. (b) Fooling rates vs. Visual loss weight w for MNIST.
Figure 6: Training networks for generating adversarial images. Increasing w decreases Targeted
Fooling Rate (TF) and Misclassification Rate (MR). TFR is always less than MR. ANGRI gives
higher TFR for same w than UPSET.
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Ci, Cj → Ck gives higher fooling rates than either Ci → Ck or Cj → Ck, when i 6= j 6= k.
This generalization gained from simultaneous training, comes at a small cost as the performance
of self attack drops a little compared to when trained separately.
4. As can be seen in table 1, the confidence, C, of the classifier when it is fooled is high.
Table 1: Comparative performances of ANGRI and UPSET for different classifiers for MNIST.
No. Trained on Victim A UTFR MR C FS TFR MR C FS
1 M1 M1 74.70 79.85 0.78 1.17 70.53 73.01 0.94 1.29
2 M2 M2 78.15 80.38 0.81 1.18 73.03 74.08 0.94 1.28
3 M3 M3 53.89 60.98 0.70 1.10 56.29 59.70 0.88 1.09
4 M1 M2 50.82 57.32 0.78 1.17 67.47 68.73 0.93 1.29
5 M2 M1 57.05 65.19 0.77 1.18 59.21 63.67 0.93 1.28
6 M2 M3 3.72 8.77 0.68 1.18 7.47 12.30 0.70 1.28
7 M3 M2 1.83 4.27 0.73 1.10 1.25 2.72 0.77 1.08
8 M3 M1 2.15 4.91 0.71 1.10 1.49 3.40 0.76 1.08
9 M1 M3 3.10 7.88 0.68 1.17 9.56 14.51 0.72 1.29
10 M1,M3 M1 58.21 66.82 0.79 1.25 55.38 59.28 0.93 1.27
11 M1,M3 M3 46.25 56.91 0.72 1.25 49.27 53.40 0.85 1.27
12 M2,M1 M2 80.17 84.12 0.84 1.24 66.16 69.08 0.94 1.28
13 M2,M1 M1 81.22 83.90 0.85 1.24 70.84 72.16 0.93 1.28
14 M3,M2 M3 54.81 60.91 0.76 1.25 55.94 57.74 0.92 1.25
15 M3,M2 M2 46.03 54.21 0.70 1.25 47.03 51.27 0.84 1.25
16 M1,M2,M3 M1 67.23 74.58 0.80 1.23 61.24 64.83 0.93 1.28
17 M1,M2,M3 M2 70.94 75.84 0.82 1.23 65.70 66.88 0.93 1.28
18 M1,M2,M3 M3 33.25 43.49 0.69 1.23 37.70 42.68 0.81 1.28
Table 2: Comparative performances of ANGRI and UPSET on CIFAR-10 in terms of TFR when
training on a single classifier. Each cell represents the (first element) TFR with UPSET and (second
element) TFR with ANGRI. C1 and C2 are both resnet style while C3 and C4 are convolutional
networks. As the bold numbers show, the fooling networks generalize better if they target networks
of similar structure.
Victim Trained on
C1 C2 C3 C4
C1 91%,94% 48%,50% 5%, 4% 6%, 6%
C2 50%,47% 90%,95% 8%, 5% 11%, 14%
C3 46%, 44% 64%, 75% 97%,98% 67%,75%
C4 40%, 36% 61%, 71% 39%,31% 93%,98%
Table 3: Comparative performances of ANGRI and UPSET on CIFAR-10 in terms of TFR when
training on 2 classifiers. Each cell represents the (first element) fooling rate with UPSET and (second
element) fooling rate with ANGRI.
Victim Trained on
C1, C2 C1, C3 C1, C4 C2, C3 C2, C4 C3, C4
C1 87%, 96% 87%, 91% 85%, 92% 51%, 44% 45%, 48% 10%, 8%
C2 85%, 96% 54%, 60% 59%, 68% 88%, 92% 85%, 93% 18%, 14%
C3 68%, 88% 95%, 99% 78%, 92% 97%, 98% 83%, 94% 97%, 99%
C4 62%, 79% 65%, 73% 90%, 97% 79%, 85% 93%, 98% 95%, 98%
5 Conclusion
In this paper, two novel methods are proposed for targeted network fooling, namely, UPSET and
ANGRI. UPSET produces a single perturbation for each class from only the target class information
at the input, hence the perturbation is universal for each target class. Since only an addition and a
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clipping is needed to generate adversarial images, UPSET is very fast during inference. On the other
hand, ANGRI has access to the input image, and hence it can produce better adversarial images as
compared to UPSET for similar levels of visual fidelity. ANGRI also performs well when the classifier
is trained with noisy images too, while UPSET’s fooling capability degrades. Unlike [1] which
requires multiple networks for multiple targets, both UPSET and ANGRI are single networks that can
produce targeted adversarial images but can train on multiple classification networks simultaneously,
allowing them to generalize better and target multiple systems at once. Both the proposed methods
are black box models, i.e. they do not require knowledge of the internals of the victim system.
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